WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., today participated in a full committee hearing discussing the future force posture for the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and United States Forces Korea (USFK).

In his remarks, Wicker emphasized that the window is closing in which Congress could provide relevant capabilities to deter China before 2027, a year many predict that China will be militarily prepared to invade Taiwan.

The window during which this committee can authorize significant capability to deter China in the near term is closing. 2027 is a few short years away, if that is the accurate projection,” Wicker said. “I am not convinced we have treated that date with adequate seriousness thus far. We will need to prioritize our defense investments more effectively here in Congress.

Commander of INDOPACOM Admiral John Aquilino and Commander of USFK Gen. Paul LaCamera testified before the committee.

In one exchange, Senator Wicker asked Adm. Aquilino about the need for United States forces to both deter China and support Ukraine at the same time.

“There’s some people who feel that our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in regard to Taiwan,” Wicker said. “Admiral…what do you say to that?”

Admiral Aquilino affirmed that we “have to” continue military support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia while continuing our deterrence mission in the Pacific to maintain peace.

“Senator, I do not [feel that way]…the United States is the only force capable of managing multiple threats,” Aquilino said. “My partner in EUCOM is executing his mission sets. I haven’t been impacted at this point as it comes to my deterrence mission. I do believe we can do both, I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.”

Read Wicker’s opening remarks below or watch them here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today.

The Department of Defense’s most pressing task remains ensuring deterrence of conflict in the Indo-Pacific.?Failure to prevent aggression there would have enormous consequences. We have already seen deterrence fail in Europe. We did not deter Putin from invading Ukraine, and not doing so has cost the global economy over $1 trillion thus far, brought untold suffering to the Ukrainian people, and heightened the threats under which our European allies live.? Our intelligence community predicts that a deterrence failure in the Indo-Pacific would be much, much worse.

We are entering a particularly dangerous period. Xi Jinping is the most powerful and ruthless leader in China since Chairman Mao.?We know Xi has aggressive intent, and he is rapidly increasing China’s military capability.

His ally, Kim Jong-un, has also improved North Korea’s capabilities to threaten the continental United States and our allies. The North Korean dictator has already provided significant weaponry to Russia’s failing fight in Ukraine. ?We also know that Xi and Putin have signed up to a so-called “no limits” partnership.

We have a lot of work to do. The Fiscal Year 2024 budget request before us is the last one in which significant programs and activities could be funded and fielded in time for 2027, the year by which Xi has told the Chinese military to be prepared to take Taiwan. That is less than four short years away.

Although a portion of the Pentagon is operating on a wartime tempo when it comes to supporting Ukraine, I cannot say the same for their focus on China.

Because this committee felt that our defense strategy was not being implemented fast enough, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative was created and requires the Indo-Pacific Combatant Commander to provide an independent assessment of resources required to meet the challenge in that region.

This initiative has allowed us to start moving our policies and investments in the right direction, but this forward motion has come in fits and starts.?For example, last year, Congress authorized and appropriated an additional $100 million for planning and design activities in the Western Pacific. These funds were meant to expand our basing and logistics footprint in places such as Yap in Micronesia, Tinian in the Marianas islands, and the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Once again, these initiatives are not fully funded in this budget.?At this pace, it would take 25 years to modernize our basing posture in the Western Pacific compared to what we did in 5 years in Europe through the European Deterrence Initiative.

Similarly, low-cost and high-value investments for allies and partners remain unfunded.?We still cannot effectively share communications and intelligence with allies and partners.

These are just a few of the important enabling capabilities we need in the Indo-Pacific.?We need much more. For instance, the Pentagon still seems unserious about building the Guam Defense System in a timely fashion. There are key space, cyber, electronic warfare, and command-and control technologies we must accelerate as well.

This committee recognizes the seriousness of the competition.?That is why this committee led the bipartisan charge to increase the defense budget in last year’s cycle, with a set of investments tailored to our most significant operational challenges in the Indo-Pacific.?I am hopeful we can do so again this year. We really have to do this again this year.

Allow me to repeat: the window during which this committee can authorize significant capability to deter China in the near term is closing. 2027 is a few short years away, if that is the accurate projection. And I am not convinced we have treated that date with the adequate seriousness thus far.?We will need to prioritize our defense investments more effectively here in Congress.

So, I thank our witnesses, you have quite a job ahead of you. And we appreciate what you do and want to work with you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.