WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, today participated in a full committee hearing discussing the future force posture for national security programming at the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

In his remarks, Wicker highlighted the weakening of nuclear infrastructure for several American defense initiatives, while China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all forge ahead with nuclear force modernization.

“Unlike our adversaries, the United States has not been urgently adapting our nuclear forces,” Wicker said. “Instead, I see long-overdue modernization programs simply plodding along. I see an administration intent on defending policies that grow increasingly out of touch with reality rather than doing the hard work to adapt our forces to current and future threats.”

Wicker specifically highlighted the acceleration of the sea-launched cruise missile program and plutonium pit production as top priorities for DOE and NNSA to improve deterrence.

Secretary of Energy Hon. Jennifer Granholm and NNSA Administrator Hon. Jill Hruby testified before the committee.

Read Senator Wicker’s opening statement below or watch his remarks here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Madame Secretary and Madame Administrator for being here.

I want to especially thank the chair for his very clear opening statement – it is obvious to me based on the facts that he outlined that we are nowhere near where we need to be and that this committee needs to take action in the NDAA to catch up.

The United States prevailed in the Cold War largely because we maintained a strong and credible nuclear deterrent. Today, the United States and its allies have entered a dangerous, new era of nuclear competition. For the first time in history, we must contend with two nuclear-armed peer adversaries, each intent on undermining America’s interests.

Just a few years ago, Beijing was something of an afterthought in the nuclear world. Since then, China has expanded its conventional and nuclear forces at an unprecedented rate. China has built hundreds of new ballistic missile silos, completed the world’s third nuclear triad, and massively expanded its nuclear weapons stockpile.

Xi Jinping also directed the Chinese military to develop missiles that can put nuclear warheads into orbit around the earth, a so-called “fractional orbital bombardment” system. Such a capability would allow China to attack any point on the planet with almost no warning – a terror weapon if ever there was one.

For its part, Russia continues to maintain the largest, most modern, and most diverse nuclear arsenal in the world. Vladimir Putin has shown us during his invasion of Ukraine that nuclear weapons are still a powerful tool for keeping adversaries in check. Considering the conventional losses Moscow has endured in Ukraine, it seems likely that Russia may grow even more dependent on the security its nuclear arsenal provides.

We have also seen recent evidence that China and Russia are now cooperating on nuclear issues. This year, China purchased over 28 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia, which is likely to be used to produce plutonium for additional nuclear weapons.

Not to be outdone, North Korea may now possess enough missiles to overwhelm our homeland missile defenses, and they show no sign of slowing down. Half a world away, Iran continues to expand its stockpile of nuclear material as it inches closer to its own nuclear weapon.

Unlike our adversaries, the United States has not been urgently adapting our nuclear forces. Instead, I see long-overdue modernization programs simply plodding along. I see an administration intent on defending policies that grow increasingly out of touch with reality rather than doing the hard work to adapt our forces to current and future threats.

For example, the Biden administration again chose to eliminate funding for the sea-launched cruise missile program, or SLCM, even as China, Russia, and North Korea field thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to threaten the United States and its allies. This move directly conflicts with clear, bipartisan direction from Congress last year to continue this effort. We would like to hear the logic behind such a move.

Beyond the SLCM, every single United States nuclear modernization program has been delayed, reduced in scope, or cancelled over the past decade. In particular, the National Nuclear Security Administration has an extensive backlog of projects to update its Manhattan Project-era infrastructure, much of which is over 70 years old, as the disguised chairman just told us.

The inability of the National Nuclear Security Administration to meet the statutory requirement to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 is also deeply disturbing. This committee has been told there is nothing that can be done to rectify this, but considering the rising threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, complacency is unacceptable.

We cannot effectively compete with – and deter – our adversaries with a nuclear capability that is undersized, underprioritized, and incapable of adapting to changing threats.

I thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee today, and I look forward to their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.